Articles

New Supreme Court Employment Cases

July, 2020

RECENT U.S. SUPREME COURT CASE GIVES MEANING TO  “BUT FOR” PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION NEEDED UNDER TITLE VII

On June 15, 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down a decision making discrimination against homosexual and transsexual employees illegal under the federal law, Title VII.  Bostock v. Clayton County, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 3252.

Connecticut already embodied that protection in its state law, the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act, (“CFEPA”).

While that interpretation provided new protection under Title VII, one significant element of the decision was the Court’s explanation of the prohibition to discriminate against an employee “becausee of” a protected category, such as sex.  CFEPA has the same language.

Under both laws, it is unlawful for an employer to fire an employee “because of” a protected category.  The “because of” benchmark implies a “but for” analysis, i.e., the plaintiff would not have been fired but for his sex.

The Court stated that even if legitimate factors contributed to an employment decision to terminate, if a discriminatory reason entered into the process, it is illegal.  Title VII does not “care if other factors besides sex contribute to an employer’s discharge decision.” Bostock, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 3252 at 40.  “It doesn’t matter if other factors besides the plaintiff’s sex contributed to the decision.  Bostock, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 3252 at 20.  A plaintiff need only show that his/her termination was based “in part” on a discriminatory motive.  Bostock, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 3252 at 26.

Under the Court’s analysis, the “because of” or “but for” reason for the discharge does not imply the primary or main factor.

U.S. SUPREME COURT CONTINUES RELIGIOUS EXEMPTION TO DISCRIMINATION CASES BROUGHT BY RELIGIOUS SCHOOL TEACHERS

On July 8, 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court again excluded teachers at religious schools from bringing employment discrimination claims.  Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, 2020 LEXIS 3547.

The holding actually consolidated two cases brought before the Court: petitioner Morrissey-Berru and teacher Kristen Biel, who taught at the St. James School in the Los Angelis school district. 

After they were terminated, both teachers brought separate suits alleging discrimination under the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967.  The religious schools defended arguing that the First Amendment Religion Clause bars employment discrimination claims brought by teachers against religious schools.

In reversing the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Court employed the “ministerial exception” to discrimination law which it held in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012).

There were four relevant factors the Court used to support this “ministerial exception:”

1. The title of “minister” was used for the teacher;
2. The teacher had a significant degree of religious training;
3. The teacher held herself out as a minister of the Church and claimed certain tax benefits;
4. The teacher’s job duties included conveying the Church’s message and carrying out its mission.